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Brown: Covenants in Leases in West Virginia

COVENANTS IN LEASES IN WEST VIRGINIA*
LONDO H.

BROWN

Benefits and Burdens of Covenants
Having seen that there are certain requirements necessary to
make covenants run with the land, it should be pointed out that
even though those elements are present other things may be held to
prevent the running of covenants. As above pointed out, there was
nothing in the statute of Hen. VIII which indicated that anything
but the benefits of covenants were to run with the land in so far
as the assigns of the lessor were concerned since the statute only
purported to give the assigns of the lessor the benefit of any
covenant or condition which the lessor himself might have had.
Therefore, in cases where the lessor could not have enforced
covenants in the lease against assigns of the lessee, assigns of the
lessor could not do so under the statute. Since statutes in derogation of the common law are strictly construed,S 0 the statute would
probably be construed not to make the burdens run as against
the assigns of the lessee.
While it appears that none of the courts have considered covenants to have run with the reversion at common law, most appear
to consider that they ran with the leasehold estate. Assuming this
to be true, and in the light of the cases on the subject,1 3' this
seems not to be too broad an assumption, then probably the
burdens as well as the benefits ran with the leasehold interest.
This would explain the court's assumption in Spencer's Case that
the burden of the covenant in question would have run so as to
bind the assignee of the lessee if it had been a covenant in regard
to a thing in esse.
It is true that the statute did not in so many words make the
burdens of covenants run as against the assigns of the lessee, but
when one goes behind the words to the purpose of the statute,
it seems that the mischief to be remedied was the fact that the
assigns of the lessor, particularly the grantees of the king, did not
get the benefit of the covenants in leases to which their newly
acquired lands were subject. It would also be a reasonable as-

* The first

installment of this article appeared at 57 W. VA. L. Rv. 1 (1955).

130Robinson's

Case, 131 Mass. 376, 41 Am. Rep. 239 (1881); Perry v.

Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S.W. 641 (1908); State v. Beale, 104 W. Va. 617,

141 S.E. 7 (1927).
1s1

See note 66 supra.
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sumption that Parliament also intended by the statute to give the
grantees of the king, and the assigns of lessors, the benefit of such
covenants to the extent that they could be enforced against the
assigns of the lessees since many of the lessees of the lands granted
must have assigned their interests, but this would follow at common
law if both the benefits and burdens ran with the leasehold
interests. It is reasonable to assume that Parliament had this in
mind.
After the statute it could well be said that both the benefits
and the burdens ran with the leasehold interest because they did
at common law, and because the second part of the statute made
the benefits run with the leasehold interest, and both the benefits
and burdens ran with the reversion because the first part of the
statute made the benefits run and the second part made the
burdens run when it gave the lessees and their assigns the same
benefit of the covenants in leases as against the assigns of the
lessor as the lessee had against the lessor.
The view that after the statute both the benefits and the
burdens of covenants ran with the land is generally accepted by the
authorities in this field,1 3 2 although some of these writers make only
broad statements that the statute of Hen. VIII made covenants run
to and against the assigns of the lessor, 3 3 or that the statute made
both the benefits and burdens of any covenants pass to the assigns
of either the lessor or lessee.134
In any event, there is considerable confusion in regard to the
running of benefits and burdens of covenants in leases. This confusion might well be due in part to the fact that many courts fail
or refuse to recognize that a covenant has such a dual aspect.
In the case of Hebert v. Dupaty,3 5 there was- a covenant by
the lessor that he would not carry on in the vicinity a business
which would compete with that of the lessee. The lessor sold
adjacent premises, and the grantee started a business in competition
with the lessee. The court held that the covenant was a personal
obligation on the part of the lessor and did not run with the land
as a burden on the land.
On the contrary, in the case of Norman v. Wells, 3 where the
lessor continued as owner of the adjacent land and the lessee had
assigned the leasehold estate, after which the lessor started a com1.321 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 125 (3d ed. 1939); Bordwell, English
Property Reform and Its American Aspects, 37 YAix L.J. 1, 20 (1927).
133

Id. at 20.

REL PRoPERTY § 125 (3d ed. 1939).
13 42 La. Ann. 343, 7 So. 580 (1890).
13 17 Wend. 136 (N.Y. 1837).
134 1 TFFANY,
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peting business, the court held that the covenant ran with the
land and the lessee's assignee was entitled to its benefit.
So, in the case of the same covenant, the benefit has been
held to run and the burden not to run. But the result reached
in both cases is supported by reason and authority. In the Hebert
case the burden of the covenant did not touch or concern the
reversion, the land subject to the lease, but concerned other land
of the lessor, and so was a personal covenant so far as the burden
was concerned. However, in the Norman case the benefit of the
covenant did touch or concern the leasehold estate and so should
run with that estate.
Likewise, where the covenant is by the lessee not to do something on the demised premises which would compete or otherwise
interfere with the lessor's business, the burden of the covenant is
held to run with the leasehold estate since it touches or concerns
that estate, and the benefit of the covenant is held not to run with
137
the reversion since it does not touch or concern that estate.
The West Virginia court would probably reach the same
result as that reached in the Hebert case since it has held that
except as between landlord and tenant no burden can be imposed
on land by a grantor's covenant so as to bind a subsequent grantee
of the covenantor.138
In the fairly early history of the West Virginia court it was
faced with the running of the benefits and burdens of covenants,
and it arrived at seemingly contrary results. Two cases concerning
rights-of-way confronted the court. In the first case, that of Lydick
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,'3 9 decided in 1881, the court held
that a covenant made by the grantee of the right-of-way for a
railroad to build a switch from the right-of-way to a mill on the
grantor's property ran with the land and the assignee of the covenantee, owner of the land, was entitled to the benefit of the covenant. Since the original covenantor had not assigned his interest,
there was no necessity to determine whether the burden of the
covenant ran. The court found privity of estate in the relation
between the dominant estate and the servient estate, the right-ofway interest granted out of the estate, and correctly so it seems
137 In American Strawboard Co. v. Haldeman Paper Co., 83 Fed. 619 (5th
Cir. 1897) the court held that the burden of such a covenant ran with the
leasehold estate; and in Thurston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487 (1870) the burden was
held not to run with the reversion. But see Clegg v. Hands, 44 Ch. D. 503
(1890), a case criticized in Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12
Mic. L. REv. 639 (1914), for a contrary holding.
13s McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 608 (1948). The court in
this case says that this is the English rule and the minority rule in this country.
139 17 W. Va. 427 (1881).
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since upon the termination of the servient estate it would merge
into the dominant estate and the two interests would again become
one estate, the fee. It will be noted, however, that the thing to be
done was not to be done on the estate granted, the right-of-way,
but on the estate reserved, but the court seemed to have no
difficulty in finding that the benefit of the covenant ran with, in
effect, the reversion.
In the second case, West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Ohio
River Pipeline Co.,14 o decided two years later, the grantor of a
right-of-way for a pipeline covenanted that he would not lay, or
give anyone else the right to lay, another pipeline across the
property out of which the right-of-way was granted, the property
reserved. The grantor conveyed the property and the court held
that the burden of the grantor's covenant did not run with the
property reserved and was only a personal covenant; thus holding,
in effect, that the burden of a covenant in such a conveyance does
not run with the reversion. In that case, however, the court
distinguished such conveyances from leases and stated that "except
as between landlord and tenant no burdens can be imposed upon
lands by any covenant of the owner, which will run with the land
141
and bind the grantee of the land".
While the fact was not mentioned by the court, it was faced
with the problem in the two cases of whether the burdens and
the benefits of covenants could run separately. In the Lydick case
the burden of the covenant was on the estate conveyed in the
original conveyance, the right-of-way, and that estate had not been
assigned, but it seems that the court would have held that the
burden of the covenant would have run with the land in view of
the reasoning which supported its holding since it held that the
covenant ran because it concerned the land and there was privity of
estate between the-covenantor and covenantee. In a later case of
the same type, 142 this issue was presented to the court. There the
grantee of the right-of-way covenanted to build a depot on the land
of the grantor out of which the interest was granted and the
grantee had assigned his inteerst. The court held that the burden
of the covenant ran with the land and the assignee of the grantee
was bound. The result of these two cases apparently is that both
the benefit and the burden of the covenant run when the covenant
is made by the grantee of the estate conveyed, and the covenant
benefits the estate reserved.
14022 W. Va. 600 (1883).
141 Id. at syl. 6.
142 Harper v. Virginian Ry., 76 W. Va. 788, 86 S.E. 919 (1915).
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In the West Virginia Transportation case, although it could
not be denied that the covenant benefited the estate conveyed in
the original conveyance, the right-of-way, and nothing in *the
court's opinion would bar an assignee of the right-of-way from
suing the original covenantor on the covenant, not even the
original covenantee could sue an assignee of the covenantor, since
the burden could not run with the land. So, in that case even
though the benefit of the covenant was capable of running with
the land, relief was denied because the burden could not run.
Whether the benefit of such a covenant would run with the land
in such a case was decided a few years later in a case where the
issue was whether the devisee of the grantor was entitled to the
benefit of a covenant made by the grantee of a right-of-way for a
turnpike that the grantor was to have toll-free use of the turnpike. 14'1
The court held that the grantor's transferee was entitled to the
benefit of this covenant since it was a covenant which ran with the
land. The result of these two cases apparently is that when the
covenant is made by or to the grantor of the estate conveyed, other
than a leasehold estate, the covenant runs with the land if it benefits the estate reserved but not if it burdens the reserved estate.
In other words, the benefit runs in one case but the burden does
not in the other.
But neither of the above cases is authority for the proposition
that the benefits of a particular covenant will run even though
the burdens of the same covenant do not, for in the West Virginia
TransportationCompany case it was merely held that the burden
did not run and the question of whether the benefit of that
covenant would run, that is, whether an assignee of the right-of-way
would have the benefit of the covenant against the original grantor,
was not before the court. And presumably the court in the Lucas
case 144 would have held as it did later in the Harper case' 4 that
the burden ran had that question been before it.
But in another case, 4" one dealing with neither leases nor
rights-of-way but with a covenant between adjoining owners, the
court dealt with both the benefits and burdens of the same covenant. The court there stated that the covenant could not run
with the land because of the lack of privity of estate even though
the parties intended that it should. However, the court held that
143

Lucas v. Smithfield, C. H. & F. Turnpike Co., 36 W. Va. 427, 15 S.E.

182 (1892).

144 Ibid.

145 Harper v. Virginian Ry., 76 W. Va. 788, 86 S.E. 919 (1915).
146 Hurxthal v. Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1903).
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the intent of the parties that the covenantee's assigns should have the
benefit of the covenant was sufficient to allow such an assign to
bring action on the covenant against the covenantor, but admitted
that intent to place a burden on the estate of the covenantor in
the hands of a subsequent owner would be ineffective. The court
in this case could be said to have recognized that the benefits and
burdens of covenants were capable of running separately when it
quoted the familiar rule that a covenant is said to run with the
land when either the liability to perform it or the right to enforce
it passes to the assignee of the land. 47
But since none of these cases dealt with leases, any differentiation between the running of benefits and burdens in them may be
explained by the aforementioned rule, well established in West
Virginia, that except as between landlord and tenant no burden can
be imposed upon land by a grantor's covenant so as to bind a
subsequent grantee of the covenantor. 48 It is not easy, however,
to see a good reason for making a distinction between a lease case
and a right-of-way case in such a situation since the same type of
privity of estate exists in both relationships.
Our court has not differentiated between the running of benefits and burdens in leases and in the case of United Woolen Mills
Co. v. Honaker 49 seemed to take for granted that our statute, 5 0
a modern version of the statute of Hen. VIII, makes burdens as
well as benefits run with the land. In that case, where the issue
Was whether a covenant by the lessor to renew the lease ran with
the land so as to be binding upon the assigns of the lessor, the
court stated, "If there were otherwise any doubt about a covenant
of renewal in a lease running with the land, the above statute
settles the question, and the court dearly erred in holding otherwise
in its decree".'r' The court was referring to the statute mentioned
next above and cited no other authority for its holding. That
statute provides, in part, as follows:
"A lessee, his personal representatives, devisees or assigns,
may have against an heir, devisee, grantee or alienee of the
reversion, or any part thereof, or of any estate therein, his
heirs, devisees or assigns, the like benefit of any condition,
covenant, or promise in the lease, as he could have had against
the lessors themselves."' 52
Id. at 92, 44 S.E. at 522.
148 See note 138 supra.
349 96 W. Va. 166, 122 S.E. 440 (1924).
3.0 W. VA. CoDE c. 37, art. 6, § 2 (Michie, 1949).
151 United Woolen Mills Co. v. Honaker, 96. W. Va. 166, 169, 122 S.E. 440, 441
(1924).
152W. VA. CODE C. 37, art. 6, § 2 (Michie, 1949).
'47
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Apparently the court in the United Woolen Mills Co. case
took the view that this statute made all covenants in a lease run
with the'land. Would it take the same view as to all conditions
and promises in a lease, personal as well as real? In fact, the
statute, like the statute preceding it, "' which gives assigns of the
lessor the same advantages against the lessee and his assigns upon
conditions, covenants and promises in a lease which the lessor
might have enjoyed, is quite often effective only if a covenant
runs with the land, and does not make all conditions, covenants
and promises in a lease run.
In a situation where it is an assignee of the lessee attempting
to enforce a covenant of renewal in a lease against the lessor or
one of his assigns instead of, as in the United Woolen Mills Go.
case, the lessee himself trying to enforce the covenant against an
assignee of the lessor, the statute would not make the covenant run.
The statute would only give an assignee of the lessee the like benefit
of the covenant as he could have had against the lessor himself.
In such case the lessee's assigns would have no rights against the
lessor unless the benefit of the covenant ran with the land. In this
respect our statute is different from the second part of the statute
of Hen. VIII which might be interpreted as giving the assigns
of the lessee the same rights under covenants in the lease against
the lessor and his assigns as the lessee himself would have had. 1 4
However, since a chose in action is assignable in West Virginia, 3'35 5 and the assignee can sue in his own name,51

the lessee's

rights under the covenant may be assigned along with the lease and
the assignee would have a right against the lessor in case of a breach
of the covenant, but that would be by virtue of the assignment and
not because the statute made the benefit of the covenant run. Possibly in such case the West Virginia statute may give the assignee of the
'53W. VA. CODE c. 37, art. 6, § 1 (Michie, 1949): "An heir, devisee, grantee
or assignee of any land let to lease, or of the reversion thereof, and his heirs,
personal representative or assigns, shall enjoy against the lessee, his personal
representative, devisees or assigns, the like advantage by actior or entry upon
any condition or forfeiture, or by action upon any covenant or promise in the
lease, which the grantor, assignor, or lessor might have enjoyed."
154 See note 68 supra.
!sHartman v. Corpening, 116 W. Va. 31, 178 S.E. 430 (1935); Wilt. v.
Huffman. 46 W. Va. 473, 33 S.E. 279 (1899). But see Rawlings v. Fisher, 101
W. Va. 253, 132 S.E. 489 (1926), where the covenantee specifically assigned his
rights under a covenant and the court held that the assignee could not maintain an action on the covenant because it was not a covenant which'ran with
the land. For some reason the court did not consider the assignee's rights
under the assignment of the covenantee's rights under the covenant. This case
was very ably criticized in DONLEY, LAW OF COAL, OIL AND GAS IN VIRGINIA AND
WEST VIRGINIA 180 (1951).

156 W. VA.

CODE

c. 55, art. 8, § 9 (Michie, 1949).
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lessee the benefit of the covenant as against the assigns of the lessor.
Without such a statute, however, the burden of the covenant would
not devolve upon the assigns of the lessor unless it was of the type
which would run with the land.5 7 And it is believed that the
West Virginia statute, in itself, does not make either the benefits
or burdens of covenants run. In spite of the statute, covenants, in
order to run with the land, must meet the aforementioned requirements for the running of covenants. This statute, and its companion
which deals with the rights of lessors and their assigns against
lessees and their assigns, being nothing more than a reenactment
of the statute of Hen. VIII, a part of the common law, should be
interpreted in the light of the common law.
The statute of Hen. VIII and Spencer's Case, being a part of
the common law, 158 were made a part of the law of West Virginia by
the constitution of this state 59 unless altered or repealed by the
legislature.910 It can hardly be argued that the legislature by virtually copying the statute of Hen. VIII altered or repealed that part
of the common law. So it seems that the law of West Virginia
includes the statute of Hen. VIII, and the interpretation of that
statute in Spencer's Case limiting its effect to covenants running
with the land, those which directly pertain to the land rather than
those merely collateral, or personal to the lessor.
If this argument for carrying the law of Spencer's Case into
the law of West Virginia is not convincing, there is an even more
effective approach. In the case of a borrowed statute, that is, one
copied from another jurisdiction,:16 the law is well established that
157 Masury v. Southworth, 9 Ohio St. 340 (1869).
158 The statute of Hen. VIII has been held to be a part of the common law
in many jurisdictions. See Sheets v. Sheldon, 2 Wall. 177 (U.S. 1864); Scott
v. Lunt, 7 Pet. 596 (U.S. 1833); Patten v. Deshen, 1 Gray 325 (Mass.
1854); Carlton v. Bird, 94 Me. 182, 47 At. 154 (1900); Sisss, REAL COVENANTS
RUNNING WITH THE LAND 73, 74 (1901); Bordwell, English Property Reform and Its
American Aspects, 37 YALE L.J. 1, 22 (1927).
159 W. VA. CONsr. Art. VIII, § 21, provides that such parts of the common
law as were in force when the constitution went into effect, and which were not
repugnant thereto, should be the law of the state until altered or repealed
by the legislature.
160 In Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 302, 112 S.E.
512, 517 (1922) the court stated, in regard to another English rule of law, "However much there might be an inclination to dissent from it, as an original
proposition, if any at all, it is so well fortified in precedents and judicial
opinion that its genuineness cannot be judicially denied nor its consequences
avoided. Being a part of the common law it is made effective here by the
constitution, and there being no repugnancy between it and the constitutional
provision, it must 'Continue the law of the State until altered or repealed by
the Legislature'."
161Authority for the proposition that the statute of Hen. VIII was reenacted in West Virginia is found in 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD : TENANT § 149 (b)l
nn. 83, 84 (1912), and Sizus, COVENANTS 'WHICH RUN WITH THE LAND 74-77 (1901).
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the borrowing jurisdiction adopts any construction of the statute
made by the courts of the other jurisdiction prior to the time the
statute was borrowed. So the construction in England of a statute
enacted there and copied by West Virginia may be considered as
accompanying the statute and forming an integral part of it.102
Therefore, it appears that since Spencer's Case is generally
considered as being a construction or interpretation of the statute
of Hen. VIII,16 3 and since the West Virginia statutes were copied
from that statute, our statutes apply only in cases where the covenant runs with the land and do not make the covenants run with
the land except in so far as the statute of Hen. VIII was effective
to make covenants run which had not theretofore run with the
land. The statement in the United Woolen Mills Co. case should
be considered with this limitation. This does not mean that the
holding of the court in that case was erroneous as the covenant
there considered was of the type which should run with the land
and is generally held to run, but the statement given in the case
as the reason for its running may be too broad.
It therefore appears that West Virginia is in virtually the same
position in regard to the running of covenants in leases, including
the running of benefits and burdens, as it would be had the above
mentioned statutes not been enacted in this jurisdiction. This
view is further strengthened by the statement in Miami Cooperative
Mining Co. v. Cherokee Coal Co., a case decided a month before
the United Woolen Mills Co. case, that "The decided weight of
authority is that a covenant on the part of a lessor that at the end
of a term he will pay the lessee for improvements placed thereon
by the latter is not a covenant that runs with the land and is not
04
enforceable against a grantee of the lessor".
Even if the statutes were interpreted literally, the first West
Virginia statute only gives the assigns of the lessor the same rights
in regard to covenants in the lease against the lessee and his assigns
as the lessor might have enjoyed. This would have the effect of
making the benefits under the covenants which the lessor had run
to his assigns, but unless the lessor had rights against the assigns
of the lessee then the assigns of the lessor would acquire no rights
against them by virtue of the statute. In other words, the statute does
not in plain words purport to make the burdens of the covenants
162 Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet. 264 (U.S. 1831); Harris v. Diamond Construction Co., 184 Va. 711, 36 S.E.2d 573 (1946).
163 Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Jeckell, 124 F.2d 339 (6th Cir.
1941); Purvis v. Shuman, 273 IIl. 286, 112 N.E. 679 (1916).
164 96 W. Va. 11, 15, 122 S.E. 286, 287 (1924).
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in a lease run so that the assigns of the lessee shall be bound to
perform them, and such burdens will not fall upon those assigns
unless the covenant runs with the land at common law.
In like manner, as stated before, the second statute, which
gives the assigns of the lessee the like benefit of covenants in the
lease against the lessor and his assigns as they could have had
against the lessor, has the effect of making the burdens of the
lessor's covenants run to his assigns. But the statute does not
make the benefit of those covenants run to the assigns of the
lessee since they must already have had rights under the covenant
against the lessor before they would have any rights against him
or his assigns by virtue of the statute. So, for the benefits of a
covenant in a lease to run to the assigns of the lessee, they must
run with the land at common law.
Thus it appears that, if the statutes were construed literally,
the situation undoubtedly would exist in West Virginia which was
envisaged by Judge Clark when he stated that the benefits and
burdens of covenants are capable of running separately; that the
covenantee's assignee may sue the covenantor when the benefit runs,
and the covenantee may sue the covenantor's assignee when the
burden runs, but the covenantee's assignee may sue the covenantor's
assignee only when the benefit and burden both run. 6 5
However, the statutes copied from Hen. VIII are generally not
to be interpreted literally, as shown by the previous discussion. In
the states which have not copied the statute of Hen. VIII, but have
adopted it as a part of the common law, it is the spirit of the
statute and not its letter which is binding. 6 It would seem that
the same rule should, and apparently does, apply where states,
like West Virginia, have gone one step further and copied, or
virtually copied, that statute. But, even so, there is nothing in
that statute, properly construed, that compels the conclusion that
if one end of a covenant, such as its benefit, runs, the other end
must necessarily run.167 And so there is nothing in the West
Virginia statute to prevent one end of a covenant running even
16

CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND

102 (2d ed.

1947).

160 "This would seem true of all the old statutes that have been adopted
as a part of the common law of the United States. As integral parts of our
common law, they have not the exceptional imperative character of our own
statutes. They have been adopted in principle and not in letter. They partake
of the vitality and progressive adaptability of judge-made law rather than the
sterility and rigidity of legislative enactments." Bordwell, English Property
Reform and Its American Aspects, 27 YALE L.J. 1, 23 n.186 (1927).
167 Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MicH. L. REV. 639, 654

(1914).
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though the other end does not run, and the West Virginia court
has not raised the question in any of the cases it has decided. This
is not surprising since the great majority of covenants in leases
touch or concern both the leasehold estate and the reversion if
they touch or concern either, and so both ends run or neither does.
And, in most cases, the litigation is between an original party and
an assignee of the other original party and so the court is only
concerned with the running of one end of the covenant. The
court is only faced with the problem of the running of both ends
of a covenant when the covenantee's assignee is suing the covenantor's assignee. 16 8
But the West Virginia court has, in effect, held that the burden
of a covenant to pay rent runs with the land by holding that an
assignee of the lessee is bound by a covenant in the lease to pay
rent since such a covenant runs with the land. 10'
No one is likely
to doubt that the benefit of this covenant would be held by the
court to. run to the benefit of an assignee of the lessor. It has also
held that that the burden of a lessee's covenant to pay taxes runs
and binds an assignee of the lessee.'" 0 There is no occasion for
the court to mention the running of the benefit of the covenant,
but presumably the court would hold that it too would run.
In Harbertv. Hope Natural Gas Co.,"-, where a covenant was
made by the lessee in an oil and gas lease to furnish the lessor with
free gas if gas in paying quantities was found on the demised
premises, both the lessee and the lessor had assigned their interests.
The lessor's (covenantee's) assignee attempted to enforce the covenant against the lessee's (covenantor's) assignee, and the court held
that the covenant ran with the land, and the lessor's assignee could
enforce it against the assignee of the lessee. The effect of this
holding was that both the benefit and the burden of the covenant
ran with the land as the case fit into Judge Clark's statement that
the covenantee's assignee can only sue the assignee of the covenantor
on a covenant if both the benefit and burden run.
But in Miami Cooperative Coal Co. v. Cherokee Coal Co.,'. "
where the covenant in controversy was the lessor's covenant to pay
for any improvements put on the demised premises by the lessee,
168See Judge Clark's statement that the covenantee's assignee may sue
the covenantor's assignee only when the benefit and burden both run. CLARK,
COVENANTS AND OTHER INTEREST RUNNING WITH THE LAND 102 (2d ed. 1947).
169 Kanawha Valley C. & C. Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 781 (1914).
170 West Virginia Cent. & P.R.R. v. Mdntyre, 44 W. Va. 210, 28 S.E. 696

(1897).

17176

W. Va. 207, 84 S.E. 770 (1915).

17296 W. Va. 11, 122 S.E. 286 (1924).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1955

11

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 2 [1955], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
both parties had assigned their interests, the court stated that this
covenant did not run with the land and was not enforceable
against an assignee of the lessor. The court was talking in terms
of the burden running, although not in so many words; it did not
state whether the benefit of the covenant would run, but it seemed
to assume that it would.
So, in West Virginia, as in most jurisdictions, the question of
whether the benefits and burdens of covenants in leases are capable
of running separately has not been answered except by implication
and the implications are not enlightening. Even when the text
writers and other authorities are looked to, the answer is not clear,
but the general view is that they can run separately. 17' 3 The most
that can be said is that the courts will have to recognize that
covenants have a dual aspect and decide cases in the light of that
recognition before the question is finally settled.
Covenants Held to Run in West Virginia
Since the West Virginia statutes do not ipso facto make covenants in leases run with the land, we must look to other authorities
to ascertain if a particular covenant does run. Therefore, it
may be worthwhile to find what covenants are generally held to run.
The most common covenants in leases which are generally
held to run are the covenants to pay rent, to pay taxes, to repair,
not to carry on a particular trade or business on the demised
premises; to carry on only a particular trade or business on the
premises; to relinquish possession of the premises at the end of
the term peaceably and in good repair; to vacate on sale and
notice; to reside on the premises; to insure where the proceeds of
the insurance, by statute or agreement, must be laid out on the
premises; not to assign without the consent of the lessor, assigns
being named in the covenant; to renew the lease; option to purchase
the premises given in the lease; and quiet enjoyment. 7 4 Many
17 5
other covenants are often held to run. '
The question of particular covenants running in leases has
not been at issue in many West Virginia cases; therefore, many of
the above named covenants have not been considered by our court.
It has been held or stated, in effect, by our court, however, that
173 "The answer to the question is not clear on the authorities, since it has
rarely been carefully considered. On such authority as exists and also logically it
would seem that benefit and burden should be capable of running separately."
CLARK, COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS RUNNING WITH THE LAND 102 (2d ed. 1947);
Bigelow, The Content of Covenants in Leases, 12 MicH. L. REV. 639, 654 (1914).
174 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 126 (3d ed. 1939).
175 1 TIFFANY, LANDLORD 8: TENANT §149 (2) (1912) lists many other covenants
generally held to run.
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all of the following run with the land: the burden of a covenant
by the lessee to pay taxes, 17

the burden of a covenant by the lessor

to renew, 177 the burden of a covenant by the lessee to pay rent,178
the benefit and burden of a covenant by the lessee in an oil and gas
lease to furnish the lessor with free gas if gas is found in paying
quantities, 79 the burden of a covenant by the lessee not to assign
without the lessor's consent if the covenant is made for the lessee
and his assigns, 8 0 the benefit of a covenant by the lessee to protect
boundary lines and develop the premises.1 '. In one case it is stated

as obiter dictum that the burden of a covenant by the lessor to
purchase improvements put on the premises by the lessee does not
18 2
run and bind the assignee of the lessor.

While it is helpful to know what covenants the court considers as running or not running with the land for use as precedents
in appropriate cases, it would perhaps be better to know why
they are held to run or not to run, that is, to find the applicable
rule of law. But, in searching for such a rule in the West Virginia
cases, one finds more confusion than enlightenment.
In the Harbertcase 83 there was a bare holding that a covenant
by the lessee in an oil and gas lease to furnish the lessor with free
gas ran with the land. The only reason given for the holding
was that the covenant was a benefit to the land. The court cited
Minor's Institutes as authority for its holding, and at the place
cited the following statement is found: "Covenants which run with
the land, are such as pass with the land, and with the reversion
respectively, into whose hands soever either may come. They are
such covenants as concern the land demised, and concern the owner
of the reversion, in respect of such ownership". 18 ' The statement
in the Harbert case that a covenant will run because it is a benefit
to the land must be taken with some reservations. In an earlier
case"1 5 (not a lease case), the court held that it was not sufficient
that the covenant benefit the land; it must also be contained in a
1.76West

Virginia Cent. & P.R.R. v. McIntyre, 44 W. Va. 210, 28 S.E. 696

(1897).

177 United Woolen Mills Co. v. Honaker, 96 W. Va. 166, 122 S.E. 440 (1924);
Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S.E. 983 (1914).
178 Kanawha-Gauley C. & C. Co. v. Sharp, 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 781 (1914).
179 Kimble v. Wetzel Natural Gas Co., 134 W. Va. 761, 61 S.E. 728 (1950);
Harbert v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 76 W. Va. 207, 84 S.E. 770 (1915).
380 Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512

(1922).

Cummings v. United Fuel Gas Co., 116 W. Va. 599, 182 S.E. 789 (1935).
182 Miami Cooperative Mining Co. v. Cherokee Coal Co., 96 W. Va. 11, 122
S.E. 286 (1924).
183 Harbert v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 76 W. Va. 207, 84 S.E. 770 (1915).
184 2 MiN. INsr. 699 (2d ed. 1877).
185 Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1902).
181
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grant of the land, or some estate therein, so that there be privity of
estate.
In the Cummings case'8 0 the court gave about the same reason
for the running of the covenant as that given in the Harbert case,
although the language used was that the covenant was for the
benefit of the owners of the land. The court in this case cited
the Harbert case as authority for its holding and added, "Consult:
Hurxthal v. Boom Co." The latter case was the one holding that
there must be privity of estate as well as the fact that the covenant
7
is a benefit to the land.18
In the McIntyre case'88 the reason given for the running of a
covenant to pay taxes so as to bind an assignee of the lessee was that
the assignment by the lessee and the acceptance by the assignee
created a privity of estate between the assignee and the lessor; that
the assignee of a lease is fixed with notice of its covenants and
takes the estate of his assignor cum onere; and that each successive
assignee of a lease, because of privity of estate, is liable upon
covenants maturing and broken while title is held by him. This
reasoning is very broad and would seemingly include all covenants,
personal as well as real.
In Kanawha-Gauley C. 8z C. Co. v. Sharp,,8 9 it was said that
the covenant to pay rent inheres in the estate as a covenant real
and binds the assignee of the term by reason of his privity of estate
to pay the rent accruing during his ownership and possession of the
estate.
In the United Woolen Mills Co. case1 90 the only reason assigned in the opinion for the running of the lessor's covenant to
renew the lease was our statute which was copied from the statute
of Hen. VIII which, as heretofore pointed out, should not in itself
be held to make covenants in leases run.
In the case of Thaw v. Gaffney,"". there was just a statement
that a covenant to renew perpetually passed with the land and was
binding upon the assigns.
In Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co.,192 the court stated
that a covenant by the lessee, for himself and his assigns, not to
assign without the consent of the lessor runs with the land. No
Cummings v. United Fuel Gas. Co., 116 W. Va. 599, 182 S.E. 789 (1935).
Hurxthal v. St. Lawrence Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1902).
188 West Virginia Cent. & P.R.R. v. McIntyre, 44 W. Va. 210, 28 S.E. 696
'86
"s7

(1897).

's9 73 W. Va. 427, 80 S.E. 781 (1914).

190 96 W. Va. 166, 122 S.E. 440 (1924).
19, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S.E. 983 (1914).

19291 W. Va. 291, 11 S.E2d 512 (1922).
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reason was given other than that by taking the lease, the assigns
take upon themselves the covenant. The statement was obiter
dictum, however, as the real holding as to such covenants was that
they did not run if assigns were not named. The reason for this
holding will be discussed later in detail.
Thus, it is seen that in most of the cases holding that certain
covenants in leases run or do not run with the land in West
Virginia, there is very little to aid the attorney in determining
whether other covenants run, and there is not much more help
in the authorities cited in those cases. As an example, in Miami
Cooperative Mining Co. v. Cherokee Coal Co., 0 3 no reason was
assigned for the statement that the lessor's covenant to pay for
improvements which the lessee placed upon the demised premises
did not run with the land, other than that such was the weight
of authority. In examining the cases cited as authority for the
statement, the reason found is that this covenant relates to a thing
not in esse and all are traceable to Spencer's Case. It is not likely
that our court would today give that as an outright reason for a
covenant's not running. In a very early right-of-way case the
court held that a covenant by the grantee to build a spur track
on the reserved land of the grantor ran with the land and did not
mention the fact that the covenant concerned something not in
94
esse.1
However, in the Easley Coal Co. case the court did give a
reason for its holding that the covenant under consideration did
not run with the land and discussed the reason at some length. In
order to understand properly that holding and estimate its effect,
it is necessary to analyze at some length the rule laid down in the
case and the reasons for its adoption by the court.
The Rule in Dumpor's Case
The reason given in the Easley Coal Co. case for its holding
that the covenant not to assign without the consent of the lessor did
not run with the land was that there had been one consent to an
assignment given by the lessor and that where there has been a
consent to an assignment by the lessor in such case the covenant was
discharged at common law; that this part of the common law, not
having been changed by statute in West Virginia, was the law in
this jurisdiction and this covenant could run only if permitted to
do so by legislative enactment. The court cited Dumpor's Case'0 5
193 96

W. Va. 11, 122 S.E. 286 (1924).

194 Lydick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 17 W. Va. 427 (1881).

295 flumpor v. Symns, 4 Go. Rep. 119b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (1603).
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for the origin of this common law rule, which is commonly known
as "the rule in Dumpor's Case." This much discussed, often
criticized, 1 6 and sometimes repudiated1 97 rule, is that, where there
is a condition against assignment without license and a license is
once given to assign, the condition is wholly destroyed and determined. The reasons given for the rule are not very satisfactory or
conclusive. The court in Dumpor's Case gave as a reason the fact
that a condition could not be apportioned, that is, as some courts
say, it is an entire condition and therefore not capable of being
released in part. 1 8 It has been said that the license gives to the
lessee the power to convey an absolute interest, free of the restraint
of the condition, and the assignee, taking this interest, holds it
absolute and discharged of the restraint. 199
In Dumpor's Case the owners demised premises for a term of
years to a lessee with a provision in which the lessee, for himself
and his assigns, agreed not to assign without special license of the
lessors. Three years later the lessors by their deed licensed the
lessee to assign to any person. The lessee then assigned the premises
to one Tubbe who devised the premises to his son who retained
possession until he died. The administrator of the latter assigned
the premises to the defendant, and the lessors claimed a forfeiture
for breach of the condition. The court, purporting to follow
cases which held that a condition could not be apportioned, held
that a license to assign to any person destroyed the condition against
assignment so that the assignee could assign without a license. As
far as England is concerned, the doctrine was never overruled, but
was abrogated by statute in 1859.20o

Dumpor's Case was followed in England by Brummell v.
Macpherson,201 and in that case, like Dumpor's Case, the covenant
not to assign without consent in terms expressly bound the lessee's
190 The rule in Dumpor's Case has often been criticized. See Dakin & Bacon
v. Williams & Seward, 17 Wend. 447 (N.Y. 1837); Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek
Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922); Brummell v. Macpherson, 14 Ves.
173, 33 Eng. Rep. 487 (1807); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 205 (3d ed. 1939).
107 See excellent discussion of the rule in Investor's Guaranty Corp. v.
Thomson, 31 Wyo. 264, 225 Pac. 590 (1924), wherein the court refused to
follow the rule, calling it a "venerable error", although Wyoming had adopted
the common law of England by statute.
198 Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890); Dakin & Bacon v.
Williams & Seward, 17 Wend. 447 (N.Y. 1837); Childs v. Southern Theatres,
Inc., 200 N.C. 333, 156 S.E. 923 (1931).
199 Dakin & Bacon v. Williams &-Seward, 17 Wend. 447 (N.Y. 1837). See also
Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 304, 112 S.E. 512, 517
(1922), where the court said that the legal effect of the assignment by the
lessee with consent was an assignment to the assignee and his assigns.
200 Law of Property Amendment Act, 1859, 22 & 23 Vicr., c. 35.
201 14 Ves. 173, 33 Eng. Rep. 487 (1807).
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assigns. The Brummell case extended the rule by holding that the
condition was discharged even though the consent to assign was
to a specified person rather than to any person as in Dumpor's
Case, and that is the way the rule was adopted in the United
20 2
States.
Generally the courts, when speaking of the rule in Dumpor's
Case, speak in terms of a condition rather than a covenant, but
occasionally a court speaks of a covenant. 20 3 However, there is a
great difference in the two terms. A covenant is a promise or
agreement to do or not to do a certain thing, and the legal result
of the nonfulfillment of a covenant is that the party violating it
must respond in damages. 204 A covenant is in the words of, and
is binding on, the covenantor only, while a condition is in the
words of, and may be binding on, both parties.20° And covenants
in leases are generally held to be mutually independent unless in
terms expressly conditional,200 and such covenants are to be treated
20 7
as independent rather than conditions precedent.
For these reasons, in the absence of a statutory provision to
the contrary, the lessor has only an action for damages in case of
a breach of a covenant in a lease, unless the lessor expressly reserves
the additional right to reenter and terminate the lease in case of
such breach.208 A condition is a qualification annexed to an
estate by the grantor whereby it may be enlarged, defeated or
created upon an uncertain event; 200 and as a consequence of the
nonfulfillment of a condition, there may be a forfeiture of the
estate at the grantor's option since he may reenter and possess
210
himself of his former estate.
There are different types of conditions. Two of the most
common are conditional limitations (more properly called a special
limitation since the term conditional limitations is also used to
designate executory interests) and conditions subsequent. In the
case of a special limitation the estate ends when the event upon
which the limitation is based occurs, without any further act on
202 Aste v. Putnam's Hotel Co., 247 Mass. 147, 141 N.E. 666 (1923); Pennock
v. Lyons, 118 Mass. 92 (1875).
203 See Aste v. Putnam's Hotel Co., 247 Mass. 147, 141 N.E. 666 (1923).
204 Woodruff v. Woodruff, 17 Stew. (44 N.J. Eq.) 349, 16 Atl. 4 (1888).
205 Langley v. Ross, 55 Mich. 163, 20 N.W. 886 (1884).
206 Palmer v. Meriden Brittannia Co., 188 Ill. 508, 59 N.E. 247 (1900);
Arbenz v. Exley, Watkins & Co., 52 W. Va. 427,*44 S.E. 149 (1903); Harness v.
Eastern Oil Co., 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S.E. 662 (1901); 3 WiLusroN, CONTRACTS §
890 (Rev. ed. 1936).
207 Newsome v. Smithies, 3 H. & N. 840 (1858).
208 2 TIFAY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 194b (1912).
-09 Langley v. Ross, 55 Mich. 163, 20 N.W. 886 (1884).
210 Woodruff v. Woodruff, 17 Stew. (44 N.J. Eq.) 349, 16 AtI. 4 (1888).
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the part of either party to the transaction; but in case of a condition
subsequent it is generally considered necessary that there be some
211
act on the part of the lessor to terminate the estate granted.
There is confusion in the cases as to the distinctions between covenants, limitations, and conditions subsequent, but for the purposes
of this paper it is sufficient to show the difference between a covenant and a condition, as shown above, and then show that there
may be two types of conditions subsequent. One type of condition
subsequent is a provision in a lease, as in Dumpor's Case, that
upon the happening of an event the lessor shall have the option to
reenter and terminate the lease, and a breach of a covenant by the
lessee is not necessary. The other type is where there is a covenant
or covenants in the lease and they are followed by a provision for a
right of reentry by the lessor in case of a breach of covenant or
covenants. In the case of the latter the covenant, being coupled
with a condition, has a dual aspect, and the lessor has the right to
damages and, or, the right to reenter and terminate the lease in
case of a breach of covenant by the lessee. 212 This is the type of
condition subsequent in which the rule of Dumpor's Case is applied in most cases today and was the type concerned in the Easley
Coal Co. case.
There is some question as to whether the rule in Dumpor's
Case is applicable to covenants as well as conditions. There is
nothing in the facts as reported in Dumpoi's Case to indicate that
there was a covenant involved in the-case. The court talked of a
condition, never mentioned a covenant, and seemed to assume that
the lessor would have had the right to reenter had the condition
against assignment not been discharged. So that case probably
concerned a pure condition subsequent rather than a covenant
coupled with a condition subsequent. In all the cases involving the
rule in Dumpor's Case that the writer has examined, with one
exception, there has been one or the other of these types of
21 3
conditions subsequent.
Some questions raised by the rule in Dumpar's case have not
been well answered by the cases. Does the coupling of a condition
with the covenant against assignment without consent make the
2

3lBurnee Corporation v. Uneeda Pure Orange Drink Co., 132 Misc. 435,

230 N.Y. Supp. 239 (1928); 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT § 194c (1912).
212"We must construe the covenant without regard to the proviso for

re-entry, for its construction must be the same in an action for damages for
breach of the covenant as in an action for the recovery of land on the ground
that the proviso for re-entry has come into operation by reason of such breach."
Bristol v. Westcott, 12 Ch. D. 461 (1889).
213 The exception is Reid v. Weissner Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 At. 877

(1898).
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covenant a condition, so that when the court says that the condition
is discharged by a consent it means the covenant as well as the
condition? When there are other covenants in the lease along
with this covenant followed by a condition subsequent, such as the
one under discussion, and there is a consent by the lessor to an
assignment is the whole condition discharged?
Both questions would seem to have logical answers. In the
case of the first question some of the cases say that the covenant is
discharged or that it will not run with the land after the assen't
is once given. 214 That seems to be the effect of most of the decisions
where there is a covenant coupled with a condition. So both the
covenant and the condition would seem to be determined. As to
the second question certainly the consent to an assignment would
not discharge the whole condition, but only that part of it giving
a right of reentry to the lessor for the breach of the covenant not
to assign without consent.
But since there is a well recognized distinction between a
covenant not to assign without consent and such a covenant
coupled with a condition for reentry for breach of the covenant, 215
the really difficult question is whether the rule applies where there
is a pure covenant against assignment without consent without any
condition attached to it. In such case, since the covenants in a
lease are generally considered to be independent of each other and
the lessor's only remedy in case of a breach of covenant is an action
for damages, he having no right to forfeit the lease, there is no
condition to be discharged; and unless the consent of the lessor to
an assignment destroys the covenant, under the rule there is no
reason that the covenant cannot run with the land.
There is authority for the view that the rule does not operate
in the case of a pure covenant.2 15 However, there is one case to
the contrary. In Reid v. Weissner & Sons Brewing Co., 211 there
was only a mere covenant not to assign without consent. The
court held that the first consent destroyed the covenant and it was
gone forever. But this holding was not necessary to the decision,
214 Aste

v. Putnam's Hotel Co., 247 Mags. 147, 141 N.E. 666 (1923), Easley

Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922).

2 15In
Kew v. Trainor, 150 Ill. 150, 155, 37 N.E. 223, 224 (1894) the court
stated, "This is not a mere covenant not to assign, but a power of re-entry for
breach of a covenant and this is declared by Thyloi, Landlord and Tenant, § 278
to have the force of a condition". In Investor's Guaranty Corp. v. Thomson,
31 Wyo. 264, 281, 225 Pac. 590, 595 (1925) the court said ,"The effect of a mere
covenant, agreement not to assign, without the right of reenty, so as to make
it a condition, is of course different from a condition".

216 2
217

TIFFANY, LANDLORD & TENANT, §

152 (1) (1912).

88 Md. 234, 40 At. 877 (1898).
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since the issue was whether an assignment by an assignee was
sufficient to relieve him from further liability on the covenants in
the lease. Further, the holding might have resulted from the
court's failure to distinguish between covenants and conditions,
for apparently without recognizing that there might be any distinction, the court held the covenant discharged and cited Dumpor's
Case and the Brummel case as authority, speaking in terms of
conditions as it did so. In the syllabus of the case the court used
tht following language:
"When there is a condition in a lease against the assignment
of the term without the consent of the lessor, and such consent is given to one assignment without any restriction as to
future assignments, the condition is waived altogether and
the assignee may assign the term without the consent of the
lessor."
In passing it is pointed out that this case was cited as authority by
the West Virginia court in the Easley Coal Co. case and the above
2

syllabus was quoted.

18

Reason, as well as authority, supports the view that the rule
in Dumpoi's Case applies only to conditions and does not extend
to mere covenants. One of the reasons given for the rule is that
a condition is not capable of apportionment, 219 and a covenant
not coupled with a condition is frequently made divisible and
capable of apportionment/° 0 A very probable reason behind the
rule is the courts' antipathy toward forfeitures of estates and their
reluctance in aiding in their enforcement,221 and this reason is
also missing where there is a mere covenant without a provision
for terminating the lease in case of a breach of the 22covenant. It
has been stated that the rule should not be extended,
If, as seems to be the case, the rule in Dumpor's Case does not
operate to discharge a covenant as well as a condition, then the
West Virginia court would probably hold that a bare covenant not
to assign without the consent of the lessor would run with the land
218 Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 301, 302, 112 S.E.
512, 516 (1922).
219
220

See note 198

supra.

Dakin &Bacon v. Williams & Seward, 17 Wend. 447 (N.Y. 1837).
221See Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 296, 112
S.E. 512, 514 (1922), where, although the fact that forfeitures of estates are not
favored in law is not given as a reason for the rule in Dumpor's Case, the
West Virginia court discussed this proposition with approval at great length.
See also Lynde v. Hough, 27 Barb. 415, 422 (N.Y. 1857); Goldman v. Feder
& Co. 84 W. Va. 600, 100 S.E. 400 (1919); Kilgore v. County Court, 80 W. Va.
283, 92 S.E. 562 (1917).
222 Paul v. Nurse, 8 B. & C. 486, 108 Eng. Rep. 1123 (1828): 12 HA1v. L.
REv. 272 (1898).
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without the aid of legislative enactment since the reason it gave for
the covenant's not running in the Easley Coal Co. case was that
the rule in Dumpor's Case discharged the covenant. In so holding
the court displayed an antipathy toward the rule. In that case,
the court stated that the covenant would run if the lessee covenanted for himself and his assigns, apparently because the rule
would not then operate to exhaust the lessor's rights under the
condition.22'1 So the court, by failing to distinguish between a
covenant and a condition, may have made too broad a statement
when it stated in its holding that a covenant not to assign without
consent which does not in its terms extend to the assigns of the
lessee does not run with the land. 21 4 But the court is not to be
criticized for this as it is a very common oversight, and, since there
was a provision for reentry in that case, the court was applying the
rule to a condition, or at least to .a covenant coupled with a condition, and not to a bare covenant.
Another reason for saying that the burden of the covenant in
question can run with the land without the aid of legislative
enactment, even where the rule in Dumpor's Case is followed, is
that by the great weight of authority an implied consent to an
assignment by the lessor, as by the lessor's acceptance of rent from
the assignee with knowledge of the breach of the covenant not to
assign without consent amounting to a waiver of the breach, does
not have the effect of destroying the condition, 2 % so it would
remain in existence and run with the land in such case. The
reason given for this result is that the rule does not apply when
the assent is not given as contemplated in the lease. Thus, it has
been said that the rule does not discharge the covenant where an
oral.assent was given and the lease required a written assent.220 It
might be said that, although the law implies a consent to future
assignments where one consent is actually given by the lessor, it
will not imply such a full consent where the law itself implies the
first consent. However, it should be noted that there are some
cases holding that the condition will be discharged by a waiver
2
as well as by express consent. 1
Another reason that the burden of the covenant not to assign
223Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 302, 112 S.E.
512, 517 (1922).
224Id. at 303, 112 S.E. at 517.
225 Plummer v. Worthington, 321 Ill. 450, 152 N.E. 133 (1926); Wertheimer
v. Hosmer, 88 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890); Doe v. Bliss, 4 Taunt. 735 (1813); 1
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 205 (3d ed. 1939); 28 HARv. L. REv. 630 (1910).
226 Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890).
227 German American Savings Bank v. Gollmer, 155 Calif. 883, 102 Pac. 982
(1909); Heeter v. Eckstein, 50 How. Pr. 445 (N.Y. 1874).
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without consent may run at common law is that it is generally
recognized that the destructive effect that a consent to assign has
upon a condition against assignment without consent is nullified
by the insertion in the consent a provision that no further assignment shall be made without the lessor's consent.22 Since the condition is not then destroyed, its burden presumably runs with the
land and is binding upon the assigns. This exception to the rule
that one consent discharges the condition is apparently recognized
in West Virginia in view of the following statement of the court in
the Easley Coal Co. case:
"Under the authorities and rules of interpretation, we are of
the opinion that, even though the assignee expressly assumes,
in general words, the terms and conditions of the lease, in an
assignment assented to by the lessor, there is no restraint on
his right further to assign, unless it is specifically forbidden
or covenanted
against in some way, in the assent or the
22 9
assignment."
If such a saving clause in the instrument granting the assent
has the effect of making the covenant binding upon the assignee
where such assignee has not expressly assumed the burden of the
covenants in the lease, then it can only be binding upon him
because of his being in privity of estate with the lessor and an
assignee is only bound on covenants which run with the land by
virtue of being in privity of estate with the lessor. 23 0 Therefore,
it appears that this is a covenant which runs with the land unless
it is discharged by the rule in Dumpor's Case.
A further reason that the covenant must be said to be one
which will run with the land unless discharged by the rule in
Dumpor's Case is the fact that it has been held that it will run, and
is binding upon the assigns of the lessee, if assigns be named in
the covenant. 2' 1 Again the only reason it would be binding upon
the assigns in such case is because it is a covenant which runs with
the land and there is privity of estate between the assigns of the
lessee and the lessor since there would be no privity of contract
between them.
228 Springer v. Chicago Real Estate Loan & Trust Co., 202 111. 17, 66 N.E.
850 (1903); Kew v. Trainer, 150 111. 150, 37 N.E. 223 (1894); Reid v. Weissner
Brewing Co., 88 Md. 234, 40 Atl. 877 (1898); Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek
Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922); 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 205
(3d ed. 1939).
220 Easley Coal Co. v. Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 307, 112 S.E.
512, 518 (1922).
220Atwood v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 313 IIl. 59, 144 N.E.
351 (1924); Congleton v. Pattison, 10 East 130, 103 Eng. Rep. 725 (1808).
231 1 TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 126 (3d ed. 1939); See Easley Coal Co. v.
Brush Creek Coal Co., 91 W. Va. 291, 112 S.E. 512 (1922).
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However, it is difficult to see why the naming of the assigns
in the covenant should make any difference in West Virginia and
other jurisdictions which follow the rule in Dumpor's Case. Some
of the courts take the position that if the covenant or condition is
single, that is, the covenant against assignment without consent does
not extend to assigns, then the rule applies; and if the covenant
or condition is multiple, that is, it does extend to assigns, the rule
does not apply.232 That is apparently the view taken by the West
Virginia court in the Easley Coal Co. case when it stated that the
233
covenant would run with the land if assigns were named.
This is a strange position to take since it is accepting the rule
in Dumpor's Case in one breath and repudiating it in the next,
since the rule was laid down in a case where the assigns were
named.2 3 4 Thus, it was originally applied under circumstances
where it is now said to be inapplicable. In Investor's Guaranty
Corp. v. Thompson, the Wyoming court, in speaking of the Easley
Coal Co. case, stated that the court in the West Virginia case
clearly appears to have repudiated the gist of Dumpor's Case when
it said that a covenant by a lessee for himself and his assigns runs
with the land and is binding upon the successive assignees.2 35 But
it is submitted that that statement in the West Virginia case is
pure dictum and will not be followed in view of the holding in the
case that the rule in Dumpor's Case is, and must be, the law in
West Virginia by virtue of the constitutional provision adopting
2 6
the common law as the law of the state. 3
In defense of the West Virginia court, it reached the correct
result in the case in spite of the above mentioned dictum, since
assigns were not mentioned and the holding was that the condition
was discharged. The rule of Dumpor's Case was the common law
rule at the time our constitution went into effect, and this part of
the common law had not been modified by the statute which may
have had the effect of making the benefit of the condition run with
232 See Childs v. Warner Bros. Southern Theatres, 200 N.C. 333, 156 S.E.
923 (1931); Investor's Guaranty Corp. v. Thomson, 31 Wyo. 264, 225 Pae. 590

(1924).

233 91 W. Va. 291, 302, 112 S.E. 512, 517 (1922).

234 Dumpor v. Symms, 4 Co. Rep. 119b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (1603); Brummell
v. Macpherson, 14 Ves. 173, 33 Eng. Rep. 487 (1807); Aste v. Putnam Hotel Co.,
247 Mass. 147, 141 N.E. 666 (1923); Investor's Guaranty Corp. v. Thomson, 31
Wyo. 264, 225 Pac. 590 (1924).
235 31 Wyo. 264, 279, 225 Pae. 590, 294 (1924).
236 "Such parts of the common law, and of the laws of this State as are in
force when this article goes into operation and are not repugnant thereto, shall
be and continue the law of the State until altered or repealed by the Legislature.
.. " W. VA. CoNsr. Art. VIII, § 21 (1872).
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the reversion, 237 which, as will be pointed out later, was in existence
at that time.
Running of Covenants in Nonlease Cases in West Virginia
When one turns to West Virginia cases other than lease cases,
one finds rules of law similar to those laid down in other jurisdictions in regard to the running of covenants.
In Lydick v. Baltimore &z Ohio R.R.

38

Co.,2

where there was a

conveyance of a right-of-way with a covenant by the grantee to
build a spur track to a mill on the land out of which the right-of-way
was granted, the court held this to be a covenant running with the
land and point five of the syllabus reads:
"If some interest in land or a right-of-way or incorporeal
hereditament issuing out of the land is granted, and in the
deed the grantee covenants with the grantor and his assigns
that he will do something which concerns the land and becomes united to it, so that it affects the value of the land, in
whosoever hands it may come, such covenant runs with the
land, and there is privity of estate between such covenantor
and such covenantee."
In McIntosh v. Vail,239 another case outside the lease field, the
court went into the question of the runing of covenants considerably
more in detail than it has done in any lease case. In that case
the court stated,
"It is contended by counsel for appellees that the covenant as to gas royalties is analogous 'to the free gas covenant,
which was held an appurtenance in Harbert v. Natural Gas
Co., 76 W. Va. 207, 84 S.E. 770. Examination for the reason
which prompted the Court's conclusion that the covenant
for free gas was a covenant real does not appear from the
opinion other than it is as much a covenant real as one to
pay money rentals on gas wells and a benefit to the land.
The first cases which developed the doctrine of real covenants
were those in which covenants between landlords and tenants,
relating to the use and enjoyment of leased premises, were
involved. In such cases the estate of the tenant was, of course,
a possessory one, while that of the landlord was a reversionary one. Existence of privity of estate was clear under
such relationship. Covenants on the part of the tenant to
repair or to pay rent unquestionably respected and concerned the subject matter of the estate of each of the contracting parties, and such covenants enhanced the value of the
reversionary estate of the landlord. Both privity of estate
and the factor of touching and concerning the land in a
237 W. VA. CODE c. 72, § 21 (Barnes, 1918).
238 17 W. Va. 427 (1881).
239

126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943).
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beneficial way existed in the case of landlord and tenant.
See W. Va. C. 8c P. R. Co. v. Mclntire, 44 W. Va. 210, 28 S.E.
696, which holds that a lessee's covenant to pay taxes is a
covenant real. Thus it is understandable that courts, when
considering covenants in mineral leases to pay royalty, to
furnish free gas, to test and develop the land, and to protect
it from drainage uniformly applied the rule of covenants
running with the land in ordinary leasehold estates." 240
It seems clear that in West Virginia there must be privity of
estate in order that a covenant may run with the land. 241 This
particular problem was brought out in several nonlease cases where
the problem is more likely to arise. The court has not seen fit to
mention this required element for the running of covenants in
lease cases often, since privity of estate is present where the relationship of landlord and tenant exists, although there was a
problem at one time as to privity of estate where their assigns were
concerned. But our court apparently takes for granted that this
element is present in lease cases, and of course it is right in so doing.
Likewise, it is well settled in West Virginia that the covenant
must touch and concern the land ih order that it run with the
242
land.
So when one considers the nonlease cases and ascertains from
them the reasons why covenants have been held to run or not to
run, along with the lease cases holding covenants to run or not to
run, it appears that West Virginia generally follows the common
law in regard to the running of covenants in leases in spite of broad
statements in the cases that our statutes make all covenants in
leases run, or that an assignee of the lessee takes the lease with its
burdens.
Other Statutes in Regard to the Running of Covenants
in West Virginia
An even greater question as to changes in the common law in
regard to the running of covenants in leases in West Virginia by
legislative enactments than the one presented by our statutes
copied from that of Hen. VIII is presented by article 4, chapter 36
of the Code of West Virginia.
240
241

Id. at 404, 28 S.E.2d at 612.

McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943); Rawling v.
Fisher, 101 W. Va. 253, 132 S.E. 489 (1926); Tennant v. Tennant, 69 W. Va.
28, 70 S.E. 851 (1911); Hurxthall v. St. Lawrence Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44

S.E. 520 (1903).

242 McIntosh v. Vail, 126 W. Va. 395, 28 S.E.2d 607 (1943); Harbert v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 76 W. Va. 207, 84 S.E. 770 (1915); Hurxthall v. St. Lawrence
Boom Co., 53 W. Va. 87, 44 S.E. 520 (1903).
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It is obvious from an examination of that article that it deals
with warranties in conveyances in fee as well as covenants in leases.
That sections two through eight of the article concern covenants
of warranty in fee coveyances is a fair inference since they concern
covenants, of general warranty, special warranty, right to convey,
quiet possession, freedom from encumbrances, special covenant
against encumbrances, and further assurances in deeds.
There is no doubt that sections nine through fifteen concern
covenants in leases since all of them specifically mention leases, or
lessee and lessor, or more than one of those terms. They concern
covenants to pay rent, cancellation of oil and gas leases for nonpayment of delay rental, covenants to pay taxes, covenants not to
assign or sublet without the consent of the lessor, covenants to
leave premises in good repair, effect of destruction of leased buildings without fault on the part of the lessee, covenants of quiet enjoyment, and covenants for reentry for breach of covenants.
While- these things are fairly obvious from an examination
of the article, the meaning and intent of sections sixteen and seventeen of the article are far from obvious. After mentioning these
various covenants and describing what language shall constitute
such covenants, and providing for the effect of such covenants, in the
first fifteen sections, the legislature enacted section sixteen which
provides:
"Each of the covenants hereinbefore mentioned in this article,
as well as the covenant of seisin, when used in a conveyance
of land, delivered after the date when this Code shall take
effect, shall be considered as a covenant running with the land,
whether such covenants have heretofore been so considered
or not, unless a contrary intent shall be apparent from the
conveyance."
Is the effect of this section to make all covenants in leases
named in the foregoing sections run with the land, whether such
covenants ran at common law or not?
In regard to the covenants to pay rent and to pay taxes, there
is not too much question inasmuch as they have been held to run
by the West Virginia court without the benefit of this article. Nor
is there much question in the case of the covenant of quiet enjoyment as it is generally held to run with the land,243 and the West
Virginia court has intimated it considers that this covenant
runs in Headley v. Hoopengarner2 4 where the court, after holding
that there were implied covenants of warranty of title and quiet
243 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 126 (3d ed. 1939).

244 60 W. Va. 626, 636, 55 S.E. 744, 748 (1906).
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enjoyment in a lease, stated, ". . . Mansfield Headley having leased
to Hoopengarner, Wharton, Karnes and Co., the remote assignors
of defendants, his interest in the seven-eighths of the oil and gas
underlying the seven acres, reserving one-fifth of the one-eighth
royalty, would be liable on his warranty to Hoopengarner, Wharton,
Karns & Co., or those claiming under them ... "
An added reason for thinking that the court would hold that
the covenant of quiet enjoyment runs is that the section of the
article which deals with this covenant, 245 seems itself to make the
benefit of this covenant, and probably its burden, run, since it
provides that a covenant of this import "shall have the same effect
as a covenant that the lessee, his personal representatives and
lawful assigns, paying the rent reserved, and performing his or
their covenants, shall peacefully possess and enjoy the demised
premises for the term granted, without any interruption from any
person whatever".
The section in regard to the covenant to pay taxes2 4' could be
construed as making the burden of this covenant run with the land
and binding upon the assigns of the lessee, since it provides that
a covenant of this nature shall have the effect of a covenant that
all taxes, levies and assessments on the demised premises, or upon
the lessor on account thereof, shall be paid by the lessee or those
claiming under him. (The section exempts, however, assessments
for permanent improvements and income taxes on the rent.)
The section in the article concerning covenants to leave the
demised premises in good repair seems, in itself, to make the benefit
of the covenant run to the assigns of the lessor when it provides
that a covenant of this import shall have the same effect as a covenant that the demised premises will, at the expiration, or other
sooner determination, of the term, be peaceably surrendered and
yielded up to the lessor, his representatives or assigns, in good and
substantial repair and condition, reasonable wear and tear ex24
ceptedy
The benefit of a provision in a lease that the lessor shall
have a right of reentry for default on the part of the lessee, in
reality a condition or a power rather than a covenant, is generally
held to run and pass to a transferee of the reversion,248 and would
probably be held to run in West Virginia. The section in article
four in regard to the effect of such a provision might possibly be
245 W. VA. CODE C. 36, art. 4,
246 Id. § 10.
247 Id. § 12.
248 1 TIFFANY,

§ 14 (Michie, 1949).

REAL PROPERTY

§

210 (3d ed. 1939).
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construed to have the effect of making both the
benefit and the
49
burden of such a provision run with the land.

There is no uniformity in the language used in the various
sections of this article. In fact, of all the sections in the article
which deal with covenants in leases, only the section which concerns the covenant to pay rent 9 0 is devoid of language which

might possibly be interpreted as making either the benefit or
burden, or both, run with the land without the aid of section
sixteen, quoted above.
The section in regard to the lessee's covenant not to assign
or sublet without the consent of the lessor 2 -' employs language
which would indicate a legislative intent to make the benefit of this
covenant run when it provides that such a covenant shall have the
effect of a covenant that the lessee will not assign or sublet the
premises without the consent of the lessor, his representatives or
assigns.
However, to suggest that these sections, in themselves, may
be construed by the court as making the covenants therein mentioned run with the land may be giving too much effect to the use
of the word "assigns", and further any effect of the above-mentioned
language which seems to indicate a legislative intent to make
the benefits or burdens of covenants run is apparently negatived
in the last section of the article and the revisers' note following it.
Since that section was enacted without change by the legislature
as a result of the suggestion of the revisers of the Code, their
intent as to its meaning is entitled to great weight in case of
ambiguity.25 That section and the revisers' note thereto are as
follows:
"The legal scope and effect of the covenants mentioned
in this article, and the person or persons by and against whom
249W. VA. CoDE c. 36, art. 4, § 15 (Michie, 1949). This section provides
that words in a lease giving the lessor the right to reenter for breach of covenant
on the part of the lessee "shall have the effect of an agreement that if the
rent reserved, or any part thereof, be unpaid on or after the day specified in
the deed for the payment thereof, or if any of the other covenants on the part
of the lessee, his personal representatives or assigns, be broken, then, in either
of such cases, the lessor, or those entitled in his place, at any time afterwards,
into and upon the demised premises, or any part thereof, in the name of the
whole, may re-enter and the same again have, repossess and enjoy, as of his
or their former estate".
250 Id.

§ 9.
25J Id. § 11.

22 In In re Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 321, 325, 172 Atl, 139, 140 (1934), the
court stated that where the meaning of a statute is obscure the reports of
committees appointed to codify the law is entitled to even greater weight
than that given a committee report, especially if the legislature enacts the
exact language of the committee's draft. See also State ex rel. Globe Steel
Tubes Co. v. Lyons, 183 Wis. 107, 197 N.W. 578 (1924).
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such covenants may be enforced, shall be determined according to the rules of law applicable to- such cases, and the plain
intent and meaning of the parties. 1
"REvlsR.s' NoT.
This section is new. Under the
language of the first section of this article, rights and liabilities might be claimed to be created in and against persons,
not parties to the covenant, and not brought within its scope
by any legal principle. The legislature probably had no such
intent, and no decision of our court finds any such intent,
but it seems advisable to clarify the matter by an express provision in the statute, hence this section is added. This provision is also made applicable to the other sections of this
article in 4which language similar to that of the first section
is used."2
In order to, clarify the above revisers' note, it is necessary that
the first section of the article be quoted. It provides as follows:
"When

the words the said . . . covenants, are used

in a deed, such covenant shall have the same effect as if it
were expressed to be by the covenantor, for himself, his heirs,
personal representatives and assigns, and shall be deemed
to be with the
covenantee, his heirs, personal representatives
25
and assigns."

5

In view of the above section and revisers' note it is doubtful
if any of the sections in the article would, in themselves, have the
effect of making covenants run, either as to benefits or burdens,
without the aid of section sixteen.
Even if section sixteen should be construed as making all the
covenants mentioned in the article run with the land, it is believed
that the covenant not to assign or sublet without consent, or at
least the part of this covenant in regard to not assigning without
consent, is the only one upon which such a construction would
have much effect. For if that section were so construed, though
the effect of that construction would be to make both the benefits
and burdens of the other covenants mentioned in the article run
with the land, this would not be in conflict with any West
Virginia holding and would be in line with some, it would be
consistent with the general tenor of the various sections themselves
for the most part, and, as noted before, it would be in line with
the weight of authority generally. In the case of a covenant not
to sublet without consent, such a construction would be consistent with the weight of authority, 2 0 and would be in line with
253 W. VA. CODE C. 36, art. 4, § 17 (Michie, 1949).
2541d.

Revisers' Note.

255 Id. § 1.

250 The foregoing discussion has shown that the reason the covenant not to
assign without the consent of the lessor is held not to run in West Virginia
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the statement of the Virginia court in McKildroe v. Darracott,25 7
decided while West Virginia was still a part of Virginia, that the
rule of Dumpor's Case in regard to assignments has not been extended to subleases.
But, in the case of the covenant not to assign without the
consent of the lessor, it was held in the Easley Coal Co. case that
this covenant not only did not run in West Virginia, but that it
was beyond the power of the court to hold that it did run, and
that the covenant could only run if permitted to do so by legislative enactment.
The Easley Coal Co. case was decided in 1922 and section
sixteen was enacted in 1931. Therefore, that section could have
changed the law in regard to the covenant not to assign without
consent as laid down in the Easley Coal Co. case.
While the language of the court in that case was the broad
statement that the covenant did not, and could not, run with the
land, the effect of the holding was that the burden of the covenant
did not run to the assigns of the lessee, since it was the original
covenantor, or lessor, who was attempting to enforce the covenant
against an assignee of the lessee after having given its assent to an
assignment by the lessee. There was no occasion to decide whether
the benefit of the covenant did or could run. As a matter of fact,
the reason assigned for the covenant's not running was applicable
only to the running of the burden; the reason being that the
covenant was discharged by the one assent to an assignment. So
presumably after the assent was given neither the benefit nor the
burden of the covenant could run, but prior to an assent the
benefit of the covenant could run if the reversion were assigned.
As stated above, the court in the Easley Coal Co. case stated
that this covenant could not run in the absence of a legislative
enactment. The reason for this was that it did not run at common
law, and being a part of the common law, the rule was made a part
of the law of West Virginia by the constitution of this state.258
is that the rule in Dumpor's Case, a part of the common law in West Virginia,
discharges the covenant upon the lessor's giving one consent to an assignment.
This rule does not apply to covenants not to sublet without consent. GermanAmerican Savings Bank v. Gollman, 155 Calif. 683, 102 Pac. 932 (1909); Fidelity
Trust Co. v. Kohn, 27 Pa. Super. 374 (1904); McKildroe v. Darracott, 13 Gratt.
278 (Va. 1856). But see Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890),
where the court stated that a license once given removes the restrictions forever
where there is a covenant not to assign or sublet without the consent of the
lessor. In that case the court indicated that the consent to a subletting would
have discharged the covenant had the consent been given in the form con-

templated by the lease.
257 13 Gratt. 278, 286 (Va. 1856).
258 See note 236 supra.
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Although the court did not mention the fact, there was a legislative enactment on the subject in existence at the time the case
was decided. But that statute, if it did anything toward modifying
the common law in regard to the running of the covenant not to
assign without consent, made only the benefit run. That statute
was substantially like our present section 11, article 4, chapter 36,
above mentioned, in that it provided, in part, as follows:
"In a deed of lease, a covenant by the lessee 'that he will
not assign without leave,' shall have the same effect as a covenant that the lessee will not, during the term, assign, transfer,
or set over the premises, or any part thereof, to any person
without the consent in writing of the lessor, his representatives
or assigns.."259
So apparently, at the time that the Easley Coal Co. case was
decided, we had a situation in regard to this covenant in West
Virginia where the benefit of a covenant would run and the burden
would not. But singularly enough, when the burden of the covenant was gone so was the benefit, since the thing that destroyed
the burden of the covenant, the consent, discharged the covenant.
However, as has been pointed out, the court intimated that even
the burden of the covenant could run if it could be shown that
it was not the intent of the parties to destroy or discharge the
covenant, and in that event, presumably the benefit would also
run after an assignment.
Granting that the law in West Virginia in 1922 was that the
burden, at least, of the covenant not to assign without consent did
not run with the land unless assigns were named, this does not
necessarily mean that such is the law today in view of our statute
making all the covenants named in article 4, chapter 26 of the
Code of West Virginia, one of which is this particular covenant,
run with the land, when used in a conveyance of land. 2 0 This
statute purports to make each of the covenants named in the
article run with the land when used in a conveyance of land unless a
contrary intent shall be apparent from the conveyance. The covenants- named in the article include various covenants of title and,
as mentioned before, the lease covenants to pay rent and taxes, to
repair, quiet enjoyment, covenant (or condition) to allow reentry
for breach of covenant, and not to assign without the consent of
259 W. VA. CODE c. 72, § 21 (Barnes, 1918). This part of this statute was
made a complete statute by the revisers in 1931. A few words were added,
including "or sublet", so as to make the statute read "that he will not assign
or sublet without leave". See W. VA. CoDE c. 36, art. 4, § 11 (Michie, 1949).
260 Id. § 16.
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the lessor. As mentioned before, the only one of these covenants
likely to be affected by this statute is the last named covenant.
In order to determine whether this statute altered or modified
the common law in regard to the covenant in question, it is necessary to determine whether a lease is a conveyance of land; since if
it is, the covenant is within the meaning of the statute.
There is considerable authority for the view that an instrument
of lease is a conveyance, 261 but there is also authority to the contrary. 2 2 Some cases distinguish between leases for a term not
26 3
But
exceeding three years and those exceeding three years.
26 4
certainly a leasehold interest is an interest in land, and by the
instrument of lease that interest is transferred. 265 Our court in
66
Nickell v. Tomlinson,2
in speaking of an inchoate dower interest,
stated, "Surely such an interest can not be properly spoken of as
the subject of a conveyance, an 'estate in land' being the only
legitimate subject of conveyance. 26 7 So apparently our court would
say that a leasehold interest could be the subject of a conveyance
if it is an interest in land, but that would not be conclusive in
regard to the question of whether the conveyance of a leasehold interest is a conveyance of land within the meaning of that phrase
as used in the above-mentioned statute.
In analyzing the phrase "when used in a conveyance of land",
it is necessary to turn to the West Virginia statute setting out rules
to be observed in the construction of statutes, and there it is provided that when the word "land" is used it includes "lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests
therein except chattel interests". 268 It can safely be said, therefore,
261 Hancock v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 186 P.2d 494 (1947); 1 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY § 74 "(3d ed. 1939).
262 See In re Tuohy's Estate, 23 Mont. 305, 309, 58 Pac. 722, 724 (1899),

where the court, citing and quoting Sullivan v. Barry, 46 N.J.L. 1 (1884), stated
"but neither the word 'convey' or 'incumber', according to its ordinary
significance, is expressive of the act of creating a tenancy for years in lands.
The former of the terms is appropriate to the transfer of title to freehold;
... That the word 'conveyance' does not, when standing without assistance in a
statute, signify its applicability to the passing of a chattel interest in realty
is clearly indicated in the case of Kinney v. Watts, 14 Wend. 23, and Tone v.
Brace, 8 Paige 598 (11 Paige 566)." See also State Board of Examiners v.
Walker, 67 Ariz. 156, 192 P.2d 723 (1948) for the view that the word "conveyance" in its strict legal sense means a transfer of legal title to land, and
Perkins v. Morse, 78 Me. 17, 2 At. 130 (1885) to the same effect.
263 See Steams Lighting 9, Power Co. v. Central Trust Co., 223 Fed. 962
(6th Cir. 1916); Shraiberg v. Hanson, 138 Minn. 80, 163 N.W. 1032 (1917).
264Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 221 N.W. 111
(1928).
265 1 TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 74 (3d ed. 1939).
266 27 W. Va. 697 (1896).
267 Id. at 720.
268 W. VA. CODE c. 2, art. 2, § 10 (p) (Michie, 1949).
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that in West Virginia an instrument of lease is a conveyance within
the meaning of the statute in question if a leasehold interest is an
interest in land other than a chattel interest.
A leasehold interest is an interest in land of some sort,2 0 9 and
it is an estate less than a freehold estate, for a freehold estate is an
estate for life or in fee. 270 Certainly as an original proposition such
interests were not considered to be land, or even estates in land,
for the owner of such an interest was considered as merely having
a right of action against the lessor for wrongful ejection, while, as
against persons other than the lessor who had ejected him, he had
no remedy whatever.2 7 1 Later, however, the owner of such an
interest was allowed to recover the land by an action analogous to
22
that which the owner of a freehold estate was entitled to maintain. 1
But, in spite of such increased rights, the owner of such an
interest continued to have an interest uncertain as to character.
The Michigan court stated in one case that, "But, without any good
reason therefor, the estate for years continued to be classified as
personal property. Mr. Jenks, in his History of English Law, says:
'It stands midway between real and personal property-neither

wholly real, nor wholly chattel.'

"273

The leasehold interest has been said to be a chattel real; a
hybrid estate deriving its legal characteristics from both real and
personal property, yet actually neither; being personalty, it is also
an interest in land.274 These interests are to be distinguished on
the one hand from things which have no concern with the land,
such as mere movables and rights connected with them such as
chattels personal, and on the other hand, from a freehold which is
2 75
realty.
The West Virginia court, after stating that chattels real are
such as concern or savour of realty, as a term for years, stated, "and
these are called real chattels, as being interests issuing out of, or
annexed to, real estate: of which they have one quality, viz., immobility, which denominates them real, but want of the other, viz.,

269
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 221 N.W. 111 (1928).
27
o0ntermountain Realty Co. v. Allen, 60 Idaho 228, 90 P.2d 704 (1939).
273-Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 221 N.W. 111 (1928);
1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 73 (3d ed. 1939).
572 Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wayne County, 244 Mich. 182, 221 N.W. 111 (1928).
273Id. at 185, 221 N.W. at 112.
274 Continental Supply Co. V. Marshall, 152 F.2d 300 (loth Cir. 1945).
275 Lincoln National Bank & Trust Co. of Fort Wayne v. Nathan, 215 Ind.
178, 19 N.E.2d 243 (1939).
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a sufficient legal, indeterminate duration; and this want it is that
276
constitutes them chattels".
Although an occasional statement may be found in the cases
that a transfer of a leasehold interest is a conveyance of real
estate,277 practically all the cases hold that it is only a conveyance of
an interest in real estate,27 and that interest is a chattel interest
or a chattel real, 279 and passes to the personal representative of the

lessee as part of his personal property rather than to his heirs as
real property. 2s0 In West Virginia this is consistent with the
statutory definition of personal property which is to the effect that
the words "'personal estate' or 'personal property' shall include
goods, chattels, real and personal, money, credits, investments and
8
the evidences thereof".2 1
The question of whether the transfer of a leasehold interest
is a conveyance of real estate has often been before the courts of
other jurisdictions in connection with statutes providing that no
covenant for quiet enjoyment shall be implied in any conveyance
of real estate. While there is a split of authority on the issue of
whether this prevents a covenant of quiet enjoyment from being
2 2
implied where there has been a transfer of a leasehold interest,
this does not mean that those cases holding that such statutes
prohibit such a covenant from being implied in a lease would
hold than an instrument of lease is a conveyance of real estate.
They base their holdings upon another section of the statute which
defines a "conveyance" as including leases for terms of more than
three years and hold that the statute prohibiting the implication
78 Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 610, 53 S.E. 928, 930

(1906).

277 See State v. Phillipsburg, 58 N.J.L. 506, 33 At. 852 (1896); Routt County
Mining Co. v. Stutheit, 101 Colo. 254, 72 P.2d 692 (1937).

278

Guerin v. Blair, 33 Calif.2d 744, 204 P.2d 884 (1949); Campbell v.

McLaurin Investment Co., 74 Fla. 501, 77 So. 277 (1917); Lincoln National Bank
8:Trust Co. of Fort Wayne v. Nathan, 215 Ind. 178, 19 N.E.2d 243 (1939); Miller
v. Hart, 122 Ky.494, 91 S.W. 698 (1906); Showalter v. Lowndes, 56 W. Va. 462,
49 S.E. 448 (1905).
279 Guerin v. Blair, 33 Calif.2d 744, 204 P.2d 884 (1949); Fifth Avenue Bldg.
Co. v. Kernochan, 178 App. Div. 19, 165 N.Y. Supp. 122 (1917); State v. Kirchner,
185 Okla. 126, 90 P.2d 1055 (1939); Charter v. Maxwell, 132 W. Va. 282, 52
S.E.2d 753 (1949); Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 53 S.E.
928 (1906).
280 Guerin v. Blair, 33 Calif.2d 744, 204 P.2d 884 (1949); Olsen v. Frazer,
154 Kan. 310, 118 P.2d 505 (1941); Ex parte Gay, 5 Mass. 419 (1809); Bramwell
v. Hutchinson, 42 N.J.Eq. 372, 7 Ad. 873 (1886); Charter v. Maxwell, 132 W. Va.
282, 52 S.E.2d 753 (1949); Lamp v. Jones, 94 W. Va. 586, 119 S.E. 676 (1923).
281 W. VA. CoDn c. 2, art. 2, § 10 (f) (Michie, 1949).
282 The court in Fifth Avenue Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117
N.E. 599 (1917), took the view that there is an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment in a lease in spite of such a statute, but the court in Koeber v. Somers,
108 Wis. 497, 84 N.W. 991 (1902) took the opposite view.
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of this covenant are applicable to leases for terms greater than
three years.283 One of these jurisdictions has held that in spite of
the statute there exists an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment in
every lease for a term of less than three years, 28 4 on the theory that
leases for more than three years come within the statute only
because the statutory definition of "conveyance" puts them within
it, and that otherwise an instrument of lease is not a conveyance
of real estate.
There is no statutory definition of the word "conveyance" in
West Virginia, but there does exist the aforementioned definition
of the word "land" to the effect that it shall 'include lands, tenements, and hereditaments, and all rights thereto and interests
therein except chattel interests".28 5 In Michigan the statutory
definition of "land" or "real estate" is that these words "shall be
construed to include lands, tenements, and real estate, and all
rights thereto, and interests therein".28 It will be noted that
this definition is similar to the West Virginia definition so far as
it goes, but that the Michigan definition does not include the
phrase "except chattel interests" as does the West Virginia definition. The Michigan court held that under their statute a lease
is an interest in real estate and comes within a statute prohibiting
28 7
implied covenants in conveyances of real estate.
But the West Virginia statute which defines "land" provides
that that word shall include all interests in land except chattel
interests and it has consistently been held in this case that a leasehold interest is a chattel real,2' 8 and this has the same meaning as
chattel interest, that is, an interest in real estate less than a freehold
interest,2 9 and in at least one case the court stated that an
20
oil and gas lease was a simple lease conveying a chattel interest.
Therefore, it is evident that a leasehold interest should not be
considered land in West Virginia, but should be considered personal property, and an instrument of lease is not a conveyance of
land. It therefore follows that a covenant contained in an instrument of lease is not a covenant used in a conveyance of land and
283 See Koeber v. Somers, 108 Wis. 497, 84 N.W. 991 (1902),
284 Harman v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N.W. 255 (1926).
285 See note 268 supra.
288 MICH. STAT. ANN. c. 8, sec. 3 (9) (1948).
287 Minnis v. Newbro-Gallogly Co., 174 Mich. 635, 140 N.W. 980 (1913).
288 Charter v. Maxwell, 132 W. Va. 282, 52 S.E.2d 753 (1949); Lamp v.
Jones, 94 W. Va. 586, 119 S.E. 676 (1923); Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon,
59 W. Va. 605, 53 S.E. 928 (1906).
289 BLAcK's LAW DIrenoARY 299 (4th ed. 1951).
290 Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 621, 53 S.E. 928, 935
(1906).
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chapter 36, article 4, section 16 of the Code of West Virginia, above
quoted, does not make the lease covenants mentioned in this
article run with the land. Those covenants will only run with the
land in West Virginia if they ran at common law. This conclusion
is consistent with the language of section seventeen of this article.21
This conclusion seems to be true in so far as regular leases
for the use of property are concerned, but there is a good argument
for the view that it is not true where coal, oil or gas leases, mineral
leases, are concerned. In such leases the lessee does not purchase
the use of the land only, with the lessor expecting to get the
premises back at the end of the term in substantially the same condition as at the beginning of the term, reasonable wear and tear
excepted; but on the contrary, the lessee bargains for and gets the
right to take valuable minerals out of the ground. There is ample
authority, especially in West Virginia, that such minerals are a
part of the real estate,292 and minerals in place are included in the
general term "land".2 95 In fact, a conveyance of land without any
94
reservation includes the underlying minerals as a part of the land.
So it would seem that in a mineral lease a part of the land
is conveyed, and it has been held than an oil and gas lease, investing
the lessee with the right to remove all the oil and gas in place in
the premises, is, in legal effect, a sale of a portion of the land,'9 5
and the same has been held to be true in the case of timber, coal
or iron ore. 296 So a guardian, who has ordinary power to lease any of
his ward's property of such character as makes it the subject of a
lease, 297 cannot lease the land of his ward for the purpose of
developing the oil in the land without the approval of the court,
as required by statute for the sale of the ward's real estate.298
A further argument in favor of the view that mineral leases are
to be distinguished from conventional leases for the use of land
29. W. VA. CODE c. 36, art. 4, § 17 (Michie, 1949). In this section it is
provided that the legal scope and effect of the covenants mentioned in the
article and the persons by and against whom they may be enforced shall be
determined according to the rules of law applicable to such cases.

202 Selvey v. Grafton Coal Co., 72 W. Va. 680, 79 S.E. 656 (1913); Reynolds
v. Whitescarver, 66 W. Va. 388, 66 S.E. 518 (1910); Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va.
826, 28 S.E. 781 (1897).

293 Kennedy v. Ohio Fuel Co., 84 W. Va. 585, 591, 101 S.E. 159 (1919).
e94 Id.
295 Jamison Coal & Coke Co. v. Carnegie Natural Gas Co., 77 W. Va. 30, 87
S.E. 451 (1915); Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S.E. 781 (1897); Williamson
v. Jones, 39 V. Va. 231, 19 S.E. 436 (1894). See also Updegraff v. Blue Creek
Coal & Land Co., 74 W. Va. 316, 81 S.E. 1050 (1914)
296 Rymer v. South Penn Oil Co., 54 W. Va. 530, 46 S.E. 559 (1904); Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 19 S.E. 436 (1894).
297 Logan Planing Mill Co. v. Aldredge, 63 W. Va. 660, 60 S.E. 783 (1908).
208 Lawson v. Kirchner, 50 W. Va. 344, 40 S.E. 344 (1901); Wilson v. Youst,
43 W. Va. 826, 28 S.E. 781 (1897).
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is found in the West Virginia Statute of Conveyance where it is
provided as follows:
"No estate of inheritance or freehold, or for a term of
more than five years, in lands, or any other interest or term
therein of any duration under which the whole or any part
of the corpus of the estate may be taken, destroyed, or consumed, except for domestic use, shall be created or conveyed
unless by deed or will." 299
The legislature, in this statute, saw fit to distinguish between
a lease granting the power to take a part of the land, as is granted
in a mineral lease, from one merely giving the right to use the
premises, by placing the former type in the same category as a
conveyance of an estate of inheritance or freehold, while the latter
type, if for a term of five years or less, can be created or conveyed
by an instrument of lesser dignity than a deed or will. This same
distinction between the two types of leases is made in the statutes
which provide that certain conveyances are void as to creditors and
purchasers until recorded. 00
However, at the same time that the West Virginia court was
holding that the lessee's interest in a mineral lease was land or
real property, 30' it was also holding that such an interest was a
chattel real or personal property.30 2 These holdings are not altogether inconsistent in view of the nature of a chattel real interest,
since such an interest is neither real nor personal property and has
some of the elements of both.
There is undoubtedly one flaw in holding that a mineral
lease is a sale of the minerals in place, and that is apparent in the
language of the court in Lawson v. Kirchner, °3 where the court
stated,
"The second objection that the court was without the power
to lease, but could only sell infant's real estate or some portion
thereof is met by the fact that the lease of a tract of land for
oil and gas purposes is a conditional contingent sale of the
oil and gas in place; that is real estate. Williamson v. Jones,
39 W. Va. 231; Wilson v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826. The title is
inchoate and dependent on the finding of the oil and gas
by the purchaser in a limited number of days. The sale never
becomes absolute and fully consummated until the conditions
thereof are fulfilled, and the contingency on which consum299 W. VA. CoDm c. 86, art. 1,

§ 1 (Michie, 1949).

3001d. c. 40, art. 1 §§ 8, 9.
3o See cases in note 295 supra.
302 Toothman v. Courtney, 62 W. Va. 167, 58 S.E. 915 (1907); Harvey Coal
& Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 58 S.E. 928 (1905); State v. South Pdnn
Oil Co., 42 W. Va. 80, 24 S.E. 688 (1896).
30350 W Va. 844, 40 S.E. 344 (1901).
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mation depends happens, and if they fail by reason of the
default of the purchaser the sale is at an end. Steelsmith v.
Gartin, 45 W. Va. 27. While it is a sale of real estate so far
as the lessors are concerned, it is only of such part thereof
as the lessee may be able to find and convert into personalty. ' ' ' 4
This case recognizes the fact that, at the most, a mineral lease
is not an unconditional sale of real estate or a part thereof. The
court had previously held that what title as was passed in such a
lease was an inchoate title; and if no minerals were found, no
estate would vest in the lessee. His title, whatever it was, ended
when the unsuccessful search was abandoned.3°
The language of the court in the cases holding that a mineral
lease is a sale of real estate seems to be too broad. While this type
lease is of an entirely different character from the conventional
type lease, it is not to be distinguished on the ground that it
constitutes a conveyance of real estate while the conventional lease
constitutes a conveyance of personal property. For example, not
only is a sale of the oil and gas in place impossible, since the owner
of the land has no property in, or title to, the oil and gas until it
is reduced to possession, and he cannot pass title to something
which is not ascertained or determined;30 6 but he does not purport
to sell it or pass title to it, but only the right to take the oil and
gas. There is not even an apparent intent in a mineral lease to
pass a defeasible title to the minerals. If, indeed, there was a sale
of the oil and gas, or coal, in place, and in the case of the last named
mineral such a sale is possible, there would be no reversion in the
grantor as there certainly seems to be as to any minerals not
reduced to possession at the end of the term.
So, logically, a mineral lease is only what it purports to be,
that is, a right for a period of time to enter and search for minerals
and convert them into personalty"0 7 And the later West Virginia
cases hold that such leases create for the lessee a chattel real or
30
personalty.
304 Id.

at 547, 40 S.E. at 345.

•0 Steelsmith v. Gartin, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S.E. 978 (1898).
.906 Blanchard v. Law, 164 Mass. 118, 121, 41 N.E. 118, 119 (1895).
107 In Harvey Coal & Coke Co. v. Dillon, 59 W. Va. 605, 621, 53 S.E. 928,
935 (1905), the court stated, "We have always thought that these instruments,
whatever their form, since they only give the right to produce minerals out of
the owner's soil, leaving him to all intents still the owner of the land and all
minerals still in the ground, though the land may be leased, were simple leases,
conveying chattel interests ..
"
308 Charter v. Maxwell, 132 W. Va. 282, 52 S.E.2d 753 (1949); Drainer v.
Travis, 116 W. Va. 390, 180 S.E. 435 (1935); Lamp v. Jones, 94 W. Va. 586, 119
S.E. 676 (1923); Fruth v. Board of Affairs, 75 W. Va. 456, 84 S.E. 105 (1919).
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The view that the lessee in a mineral lease has a chattel
interest or personal property, and that the instrument of lease in
such case is not a conveyance of land but a conveyance of a chattel
interest in land, is not necessarily inconsistent with the abovementioned statutes.3 0 9 Those statutes do not show a legislative
intent that a conveyance of an interest or term under which a part
of the corpus of the estate may be taken should be considered a
conveyance of real estate, but rather evidence an intent that such
a conveyance should be made by an instrument having a certain
dignity or formality and, since it affects the value of the estate in
the hands of future owners, it should be recorded to protect
creditors and purchasers. The same intent is shown in regard to
leases for terms of more than five years, since they too take a
substantial bite out of the fee.
Therefore, it is submitted that leases, whether they be of
the conventional type or mineral leases, are not conveyances of land
within the meaning of chapter 36, article 4, section 16 of the Code
of West Virginia, and that that statute does not, of itself, make any
covenant in leases run with the land.3 10
That this statute applies only to those covenants in the article
having to do with conveyances of freehold estates is further borne
out by the fact that this statute was suggested to the legislature by
the revisers of the code, and the revisers' note following the statute
states,
"There is a conflict of'authority in the United States as to
whether certain covenants, such as those of 'right to convey'
and 'against encumbrances' can be enforced by anyone except
the original grantees. Many of the states by statute, and
others by decision, have adopted the view that these covenants
would be more useful if they would run with the land. The
same observation applies to the covenant of seisin, which,
while not mentioned in our statute, might be used in a
deed."'
From this note it appears that the revisers intentionally limited
the effect of the statute by inserting the phrase "when used in a
conveyance of land", since all the covenants mentioned by the
revisers in their note have to do with conveyances of freehold
estates and not leases, and since the revisers spoke in terms of
certain covenants "such as" those covenants, probably meaning
309 See notes 299 and 300 supra.
310 But see 5 Mimm's Jua., Covenants §§ 12, 17 (1950), where a contrary

view is apparently taken without an analysis of the statute.
3 See note 252 supra, for authority that revisers' notes are entitled to
weight where the language of a statute is obscure.
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those covenants and others of the same class. A further indication
that this was the intent of the revisers lies in the fact that there
is a split of authority in the United States as to whether the
covenants they named, the covenants of seisin, right to convey,
and against encumbrances, run with the land. The view that they
do run has been adopted by the textbook writers, and occasionally
a statute specifically provides for their running.' 12 The same is
not true in regard to the lease covenants mentioned in this article
of the Code.
Conclusion
As a result of the foregoing discussion, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the common law rules in regard to the running
of covenants in leases prevail in West Virginia, since they have
apparently not been changed by any legislative enactments in that
field.
As a general proposition, it can be said that both the benefits
and the burdens of such covenants run with the land in West
Virginia since they both ran at common law, but it is possible in
certain instances for one to run without the other running.
The rule in Dumpor's Case to the effect that where there is
a covenant in a lease not to assign the lease without the consent of
the lessor coupled with a condition subsequent giving the lessor
a right to reenter and terminate the lease in case of a breach of this
covenant, or where there is a condition against assignment of the
lease without the lessor's consent, one consent by the lessor will
ordinarily discharge the covenant or condition whether assigns
are named in the lease or not, is a part of the common law and
is effective here.
Chapter 36, article 4, section 16 of the Code of West Virginia,
could be so amended as to include expressly the lease covenants
mentioned in that article, and the only changes in the law of
running of covenants would be a repudiation of the rule in
Dumpor's Case and the covenant not to assign without the consent
of the lessor would run with the land in certain instances where
it does not do so now. This would probably be consistent with
the intent of the parties in many instances. A repudiation of the
rule in Dumpor's Case would be, in the writer's opinion, a progressive move. As has been seen, that rule has been criticized in some
jurisdictions, repudiated in others and misunderstood and mis312 4 TFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §

1022 (3d ed. 1939).
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applied in many instances; and the rule has been abrogated by
3 13
statute in England where it originated.
The West Virginia court, in its consideration of the cases in
this field, has generally reached the correct result in its holdings,
although there is language in the cases which might very well
lead to incorrect results in the future if the court is inadvertently
persuaded that that language represents correct statements of
the law.

• 1.. See notes 196, 197 and 200 supra.
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